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Taking Pennsylvania Off Life Support: A
Systems-Based Approach to Resolving
Pennsylvania's Medical Malpractice Crisis
Kristen R. Salvatore*
I. Introduction
Pennsylvania is currently in the midst of a medical malpractice
crisis. The state's malpractice insurance rates are among the highest in
the nation.' As a result of the extraordinarily high premiums for
malpractice insurance, physicians and hospitals in Pennsylvania are
forced to abandon many forms of high-risk practice. 2 Moreover, many
physicians and insurance carriers are moving to other states.
3
A tremendous amount of controversy exists over what should be
considered the best solution to alleviate this "crisis."' 4 Overwhelmingly,
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1. RANDALL R. BOVBJERG & ANNA BARTOW, UNDERSTANDING PENNSYLVANIA'S
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS 12-14 (2003) (finding that Pennsylvania ranked ninth
highest in the nation in 2000, approximately 50 percent above the national average in
physician insurance premiums).
2. Hosp. & HEALTHSYS. ASS'N OF PA., AN OVERVIEW OF THE MEDICAL LIABILITY
ENVIRONMENT IN PENNSYLVANIA 1 (2002) (citing HosP. & HEALTHSYS. ASS'N OF PA.,
Member Survey on Medical Liability Coverage (2002)), at www.keepdocsinthevalley.
org/downloads/hap.pdf (last visited June 20, 2004). In 2002, over 75 hospital services
had been closed or curtailed, with the most severely affected ones being general surgery,
neurosurgery, obstetrics, and orthopedics. Id.
3. According to a recent poll taken in August through September 2002, more than a
third of the Pennsylvanians polled "said that their doctor has left the practice of medicine
or has left the state, or that the doctor's office or health facility they use has closed, due to
the medical liability crisis." The poll was conducted by Princeton Survey Research
Associates for the Pew Charitable Trusts' Pennsylvania Malpractice Study; General
Public Survey; June 17-July 8, 2002. Cited in id. Moreover, many insurance carriers
have had to exit the medical liability insurance market altogether or "dramatically
increase premiums to stabilize their financial conditions." Id. at 5.
4. See infra notes 5-9.
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the most highly debated issue is whether Pennsylvania should place a
$250,000 cap on pain and suffering awards in medical malpractice
cases. 5 Other leading arguments include: instituting special courts for
reviewing medical malpractice claims, 6 creating screening panels to
weed out "frivolous" claims,7 implementing general insurance reform,
or instituting a no-fault approach to malpractice. 9
However, to get to the heart of the problem, the best remedy for
Pennsylvania is to develop a system that reduces medical errors by
identifying problems and implementing solutions to improve patient
safety. A "systems-based" approach to error reduction focuses not on
bad actors, but rather, on "individuals who are trying to do the right
thing, but, because they work in an imperfect system, make errors."10 No
matter how experienced or careful health care providers are, mistakes
happen." I  Pennsylvania's former Secretary of Health, Robert S.
Zimmerman, Jr., agrees, and has stated that, "[m]ost medical errors are
caused by system problems-not by human error alone."' 2 The Institute
of Medicine has reported that approximately 98,000 Americans die each
5. See, e.g., Shannon P. Duffy, et al., Caps Dominate Senate Med Mal Hearing, PA.
LAW WKLY, Sept. 22, 2003, at 9; Marc Levy, Senate focuses on malpractice caps,
CENTRE DAILY TIMES, Sept. 16, 2003, at 5; Our Opinion: Playing politics with
malpractice: There isn't enough data to know ira cap on malpractice awards will lower
insurance premiums for Pennsylvania doctors, YORK DAILY REC., Sept. 19, 2003, at A06;
Jeffrey E. Piccola, Cap Noneconomic damages, attorney's fees, PHYSICIAN'S NEWS DIG.,
June 2003, available at http://www.physiciansnews.com/commentary/603piccola.html
(last visited June 20, 2004); Karl Stark, California's malpractice-suit cap eyed in
Pennsylvania Congress, FOUNDATION FOR TAXPAYER & CONSUMER RTS., June 30, 2003,
available at http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/healthcare/nw/nw003450.php3 (last
visited June 20, 2004); Connie Williams, Cap for medical malpractice only, PHYSICIAN'S
NEWS DIG., June 2003, available at http://www.physiciansnews.com/commentary/
603williams.html (last visited June 20, 2004).
6. See CATHERINE T. STRUVE, EXPERTISE IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION:
SPECIAL COURTS, SCREENING PANELS, AND OTHER OPTIONS 68-80 (2003), available at
http://medialiabilitypa.org/research/struvel003/StruveReport.pdf (last visited June 20,
2004).
7. See id. at 55-67.
8. See BOVBJERG & BARTOW, supra note 1, at 45-46.
9. See Dan Shapiro, Beyond the blame: a no-fault approach to malpractice, NEW
YORK TIMES, Sept. 23, 2003, available at http://www.trinity.edu/eschumac/
HCAD5313/Beyond%20the%20Blame%20A%2ONo-Fault%2OApproach%20to%20
Malpractice.htm (last visited June 20, 2004).
10. Bryan A. Liang, The Adverse Event of Unaddressed Medical Error: Identifying
and Filing the Holes in the Health-Care and Legal Systems, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 346,
347 (2001).
11. JAMES REASON, HUMAN ERROR 2 (1990).
12. Department of Health Releases Guidelines to Hospitals for Reporting Medical
Errors, Other Serious Incidents, PA. DEPT. OF HEALTH, May 1, 2000, available at
http://www.dsfhealth.state.pa.us/health/cwp/view.asp?A= 190&Q=206356&healthNav =
%7C4448%7C (last visited June 20, 2004).
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year due to medical errors. 13 "While some negligence can be blamed on
incompetent or impaired physicians, most negligent treatment is
provided by good physicians who err."'
14
Pennsylvania has taken a step in the right direction to help reduce
medical errors by creating the Patient Safety Authority, a relatively new
independent state agency established under Act 13 of 2002, the Medical
Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act ("MCARE"). 15  The
Authority is charged with analyzing data on serious events 16 and
incidents 17 submitted by hospitals, ambulatory surgical facilities, and
birthing centers, and making recommendations to improve the safety and
quality of medical care.18 However, despite its usefulness, more can be
done in the area of error reduction that is not currently being
accomplished by the Authority. 19  Pennsylvania would be wise to
implement some of the procedures that the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations ("JCAHO") uses to evaluate
the compliance of health care organizations. "JCAHO is the nation's
oldest and largest health care accrediting body., 20 The mission of this
independent, non-profit organization is "to continuously improve the
safety and quality of care provided to the public through the provision of
health care accreditation and related services that support performance
improvement in health care organizations. '1 If improvements are made
to the Authority, error reduction will occur, which should reduce the high
number of medical malpractice claims that Pennsylvania is currently
experiencing.
The purpose of this Comment is to develop the best long-term
13. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM
26, 31 (2000).
14. Jennifer Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod, Malpractice Liability for Physicians and
Managed Care Organizations, 78 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1929, 1931 (2003).
15. Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1303.101-910 (2004).
16. A "serious event" is defined as "[a]n event, occurrence or situation involving the
clinical care of a patient in a medical facility that results in death or compromises patient
safety and results in an unanticipated injury requiring the delivery of additional health
care services to the patient." Id. § 1303.302.
17. An "incident" is defined as "[a]n event, occurrence or situation involving the
clinical care of a patient in a medical facility which could have injured the patient but did
not either cause an unanticipated injury or require the delivery of additional health care
services to the patient." Id.
18. See § 1303.304 (5)(i), (7).
19. See infra Part IV, section B.
20. Frequently Asked Questions about the Joint Commission, JOINT COMM'N ON
ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., available at http://www.jcaho.com/news+room/
faqs/index.htm (last visited June 20, 2004).
21. Facts about the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations, JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., available at
http://www.jcaho.org/about+us/ (last visited June 20, 2004).
2004]
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solution to Pennsylvania's medical malpractice crisis. Specifically, this
Comment will analyze MCARE's newly established Patient Safety
Authority and develop a methodology by which it can be improved. Part
II provides a history of the medical malpractice crisis, dating back to the
mid-i 970s, and describes the laws that have been enacted thus far to aid
in the crisis. Included in this section is a description of the MCARE Act,
with a focus on the new Patient Safety legislation. Part III describes how
a "systems-based" approach to error reduction operates and why it is
important. Part IV proposes ways in which MCARE's Patient Safety
Authority can be strengthened by making comparisons to JCAHO. Part
V discusses fairness considerations in resolving the current crisis and
why strengthening the role that the Authority plays is the optimal
solution to lowering malpractice insurance premiums compared to
alternative solutions. Finally, Part VI concludes with a call for
improvements in the current system of patient safety.
II. Background Of The Medical Malpractice Crisis
It is undisputed that Pennsylvania, along with the rest of the nation,
22is currently experiencing a medical malpractice crisis . However, this
nation-wide "crisis" is not unprecedented.23 In fact, this is the third time
in the last three decades that this country has experienced such a crisis.
24
A. The 1970s' Crisis
In the mid-1970s, medical malpractice insurance exploded across
the country with some health care providers increasing their premiums
25up to 500 percent.   However, other insurers left the market altogether
because they were simply "'unwilling to accept the tremendously high
risk associated with this type of coverage.' 26  The insurance crisis
22. See, e.g., BOVBJERG & BARTOW, supra note 1, at 1.
23. See BOVBJERG & BARTOW, supra note 1, at 2.
24. See id. (finding that there was a medical malpractice crisis in the 1970s and
1980s).
25. David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, Toward a Workable Model of "No-
Fault" Compensation for Medical Injury in the United States, 27 AM. J. L. & MED. 225
(2001); see also Lisa T. Meeks, Ohio Blows the Lid Off the Medical Malpractice Damage
Cap: Morris v. Savoy, 20 N. Ky. L. REV. 569, 571 (1993) (citing United States Dep't of
Health, Education & Welfare, Report of the Secretary's Comm 'n on Medical Malpractice
1, 2 (1973) (Public Document reference: P.D. HE1.2: M46/10)) (reporting that insurance
rates increased 115 percent for dentists, 262.7 percent for hospitals, 540.8 percent for
physicians other than surgeons, and 949.2 percent for surgeons between 1960 and 1970).
26. Meeks, supra note 25, at 571-72 (quoting All Indus. Medical Malpractice Ins.
Comm., The Problems of Insuring Medical Malpractice 1, reprinted in Hearing on
Examination of the Continuing Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis Before the
Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 184 (1975)).
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resulted from an increased number of medical malpractice claims filed
and the size of settlements and verdicts from such claims.27 However,
other factors, including insurer pricing practices,28 related insurance
cycles, 29 and decreased returns from insurers' portfolios 30 may also have
contributed to the crisis.
3 1
Many state legislatures responded to the crisis by enacting
32malpractice insurance regulation, implementing measures that
addressed physician competency, and instituting malpractice litigation
reforms, 33 such as caps on non-economic damages, non-judicial
screening panels, and restrictions on attorneys' fees collected by lawyers
representing plaintiffs.34 Congress also attempted to aid in the crisis by
considering numerous proposals, such as the Federal Medical
Malpractice Insurance Act of 197535 and the Alternative Medical
27. Studdert & Brennan, supra note 25, at 225.
28. See Kathy Kendall, Latent Medical Errors and Maine's Statute of Limitations for
Medical Malpractice: A Discussion of the Issues, 53 ME. L. REV. 589, 601 n.79 (2001)
(citing Thomas P. Hagen, This May Sting A Little-A Solution to the Medical
Malpractice Crisis Requires Insurers, Doctors, Patients, and Lawyers to Take Their
Medicine, 26 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 147, 166-68 (1992)) ("discussing insurers' alleged
excessive profit taking and mismanagement as contributing to the crisis").
29. See Kendall, supra note 28, at 602 n.80 (citing PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 8 (1991)) (finding that there are several stages to insurance
cycles, including: (1) insurers depend on capital derived from premiums and reserves in
order to decide what "risks" to accept; (2) premiums increase to generate additional
capital when overall capacity is limited; (3) insurers are attracted to the industry and
bring more capital and ability to bear risk when profits improve; (4) insurance supply
exceeds demand; (5) premiums drop when the market becomes more competitive;
(6) profits drop and insurers leave the market; and (7) the overall capacity of the industry
to bear risk reduces).
30. See Kendall, supra note 28, at 602 (noting that decreased investment profits
caused insurers to increase premiums in order to compensate for unsatisfactory returns).
31. Id. at 601-02.
32. Most states created Joint Underwriting Associations (JUAs) during the1970s,
primarily to address concerns about decreased availability of coverage. The associations
generally consisted of a pool of the state's malpractice carriers, and business practices
were conducted centrally. In addition to stability from centralized management, the
legislatures guaranteed the solvency of JUAs, which insured that physicians in highrisk
specialties would not be denied coverage. Kendall, supra note 28, at 603 n.89.
33. Id.
34. See Anna B. Torrance, Legal obstacles to Tort Reform in Pa., PHYSICIAN'S
NEWS DIG., June 2001, at http://www.physiciansnews.com/law/601torrance.html (last
visited June 20, 2004); see also Medical Liability Reform Preserves Access to Courts,
AM. C. OF SURGEONS PROF. Ass'N, Jul. 30, 2003, available at
http://www.facs.org/acspa/preserveacces.html (last visited June 20, 2003) (finding that
the most well-known cap enacted as a result of the medical malpractice crisis of the
1970s was California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3333.2 (2004), and that MICRA limits general damages for pain, suffering,
inconvenience, disfigurement, or loss of quality of life to $250,000).
35. Larry M. Pollack, Medical Maloccurrence Insurance: A First Party No-Fault
Insurance Proposal for Resolving the Medical Malpractice Insurance Controversy, 20 U.
2004]
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Liability Act of 1985.36
Similar to the rest of the country, Pennsylvania was experiencing a
dramatic increase in the number of malpractice suits and the amount of
malpractice judgment pay-outs.37 This increase resulted in rising
medical malpractice insurance rates and the disappearance of malpractice
insurance carriers. Pennsylvania's response to the 1970s' malpractice
crisis was the enactment of the Health Care Services Malpractice Act of
1975 ("Act 11 1"). 39 The two primary purposes of Act 11 1 were: (1) "to
make available professional liability insurance to health care
practitioners at a reasonable cost ' 40 and (2) "to establish an alternative
system to enable a person with a medical malpractice claim to obtain a
'prompt adjudication' of his/her claim and the recovery of 'fair and
reasonable compensation.'41
To carry out these purposes, the Pennsylvania legislature focused
primarily on the issue of insurance.42 For instance, the legislature
required all health care providers to carry a set minimum amount of
primary coverage. 43  Additionally, the legislature created the Medical
Professional Liability Catastrophe Loss Fund ("CAT Fund"),44 a second
MICH. J.L. REF. 1245, 1252 n.26 (1987) (The Federal Medical Malpractice Insurance Act
of 1975 was a collection of closely related bills: S. 482, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)
(National Medical Malpractice Insurance and Arbitration Act of 1975); S. 188, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (Federal Medical Malpractice Insurance Act of 1975); S. 215,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (National Medical Injury Compensation Insurance Act of
1975). Cf. H.R. 13870 and S. 3286, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (Comprehensive
National Health Insurance Act of 1974)).
36. Pollack, supra note 35, at 1252 n.27 (H.R. 5400, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984)).
37. Robert E. Kelly, Jr., Selected Statutory Law Affecting Malpractice Litigation
(1991), reprinted in PA. BAR INST., TOUGH PROBLEMS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 71
(1992).
38. Id. at 72.
39. Id. at 71 (Health Care Services Malpractice Act of 1975, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§§ 1301.101-102, repealed by Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act of
2002, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1303.101-910).
40. Kelly, Jr., supra note 37, at 72.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 74-77. Additional, although less fundamental, provisions in Act 111
described: the development of arbitration panels for health care, the public collateral
source rule, subrogation, when punitive damages could be awarded, the limitation on
attorney's fees, the statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions, medical
warranties, and the creation of medical review and licensing boards. Id. at 74-77
(describing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1301.301, 602-606 (1975)); see also Kandy G.
Webb, Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation-A First Checkup, 50 TUL. L. REV. 655,
686 (1976) (describing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1301.901-902 (1975)).
43. Kelly, Jr., supra note 37, at 72. Initially, the statute provided limits of $100,000
per occurrence and $300,000 per annual aggregate or $150,000/$450,000, depending
upon certain factors. Id.
44. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.701 (1975), repealed by Medical Care Availability
and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act of Mar. 20, 2002, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§§ 1303.101-910.
[Vol. 109:1
TAKING PENNSYLVANIA OFF LIFE SUPPORT
layer of insurance above the primary insurance coverage.45 Under the
CAT Fund,46 health care providers must pay a surcharge to the fund to
ensure money is available to compensate patients.47 Moreover, a Joint
Underwriting Association ("JUA") was established, which made basic
insurance coverage available to qualified health care providers who were
unable to obtain coverage through the ordinary commercial market.48
Although Act Ill may have helped alleviate Pennsylvania's
Medical Malpractice Crisis in the 1970s, it was only temporary. By the
mid-1980s, another crisis had emerged.49
B. The 1980s' Crisis
Unlike the 1970s, availability of liability insurance was not a
problem in the 1980s because "physician-sponsored malpractice insurers
had grown up as a response to the earlier crisis. ' 50 However, during the
1980s, there was both a rise in medical malpractice litigation and a
national concern regarding the quality of medical care. 51 This rise in
medical malpractice contributed to an increase of insurance costs for all
hospitals and physicians from $2.5 billion in 1983 to $4.7 billion in
1985.52 Thus, Congress believed that "[a] more effective mechanism
was required to impair the ability of health care providers with
questionable backgrounds to migrate from state to state and establish
new practice. 53
Pennsylvania's answer to the 1980s' crisis was the enactment of the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 ("HCQIA").54
Responding to the medical malpractice crisis and uncertainties about the
effectiveness of self-regulation by the medical profession, the Federal
45. Id.
46. The CAT Fund is now known as the MCARE Act. See id.
47. Kelly, Jr., supra note 37, at 73.
48. Id. at 74 (describing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1301.801-811).
49. See infra Part II, section B.
50. Randall R. Bovbjerg & Frank A. Sloan, No-Fault for Medical Injury: Theory
and Evidence, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 53, 61-62 (1998).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 11101(1) (2004) (Congress found that there was an "increasing
occurrence of medical malpractice" and a "need to improve the quality of medical
care.").
52. David J. Nye, et al., The Causes of the Medical Malpractice Crisis: An Analysis
of Claims Data and Insurance Company Finances, 76 GEO. L.J. 1495, 1496 (1988)
(citing U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 2
(1987)).
53. RICHARD L. GRANVILLE, ET AL., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE NATIONAL
PRACTITIONER DATA BANK: AN OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA
BANK-THE PRIVATE SECTOR REQUIREMENTS 1 (1997), available at http://www.afip.org/
Departments/legalmed/openfile97/npdb.pdf (last visited June 20, 2004).
54. Kelly, Jr., supra note 37, at 71 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (1986)).
2004]
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government attempted to bolster medical peer review by passing this
Act.55  The HCQIA requires hospitals to consult with the National
Practitioner Data Bank ("NPDB") 56 when they consider granting a doctor
staff privileges 5 and to inform the NPDB when a physician's privileges
are suspended.5 8 Additionally, the HCQIA makes records reported to the
data bank confidential,59 provides standards for hospital peer review
committees, and grants immunity for those involved in peer review.
60
Unfortunately, the enactment of the HCQIA has not proven sufficient to
solve the medical malpractice crisis that Pennsylvania is currently
experiencing, and, therefore, other measures must be taken.
C. Today's Crisis
The three primary sources that Pennsylvania currently uses to
regulate the practice of medicine are the Medical Practice Act of 1985,61
the Regulations of the State Board of Medicine,62 and the Medical Care
Availability and Reduction of Error Act.6 3
1. The Medical Practice Act of 1985
The Medical Practice Act of 1985 ("MPA") 64 governs the practice
of medicine in Pennsylvania.6 5 By virtue of the MPA, the State Board of
Medicine has the power to adopt regulations that are reasonably
necessary to accomplish the purposes of the MPA,66 including the
authority to promulgate regulations defining the "accepted standard of
care" that all practitioners must meet.67 The Board is also empowered to
55. Id. at 72.
56. The NPDB is a system for reporting adverse actions affecting health care
practioners' hospital privileges, credentials, license status, and medical malpractice
judgments and settlements. 45 C.F.R. § 60.9(a)(3) (2004). It was established to reduce
the occurrence of disciplined doctors migrating to other states or hospitals in order to
avoid punishment and public scrutiny. Id.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 11 135(a)(1) (2004).
58. Kelly, Jr., supra note 37, at 78.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 11137(b) (2004).
60. Id. § lIlll(a)(1).
61. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 422.1-51 a.
62. 49 PA. CODE, §§ 16.1-18.309 (2004).
63. Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1303.101-910 (2004).
64. Medical Practice Act (MPA), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 422.1-51a (2004).
65. Id. A separate act governs osteopathic physicians. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§§ 271.2-18 (2004); see also 49 PA. CODE § 25.1-607 (2004). These rules will not be
further discussed since they are very similar to the rules governing allopaths.
66. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 422.8.
67. Id. § 422.41(8)(ii); see also Pa. Med. Soc'y v. State Bd. of Med., 546 A.2d 720
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (describing § 422.41).
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take disciplinary or corrective action 68 against practitioners who are in
violation of any of the provisions set forth in the Act 69 or who engage in
unprofessional 70 or immoral conduct 7' as described in chapter 16 of title
68. When the board is empowered to take disciplinary or corrective action against a
board-regulated practitioner, the board may:
(1) Deny the application for a license, certificate or any other privilege granted
by the board.
(2) Administer a public reprimand with or without probation.
(3) Revoke, suspend, limit or otherwise restrict a license or certificate.
(4) Require the board-regulated practitioner to submit to the care, counseling or
treatment of a physician or a psychologist designated by the board.
(5) Require the board-regulated practitioner to take refresher educational
courses.
(6) Stay enforcement of any suspension, other than that imposed in accordance
with section 40, and place a board-regulated practitioner on probation with the
right to vacate the probationary order for noncompliance.
(7) Impose a monetary penalty in accordance with this act.
Id. § 422.42(a).
69. The board has the authority to impose disciplinary or corrective measures on a
board-regulated practitioner for any of the following reasons:
(1) Failing to demonstrate the qualifications or standards for a license,
certification or registration.
(2) Making misleading, deceptive, untrue or fraudulent representations in the
practice of the profession or practicing fraud or deceit in obtaining a license,
certification or registration or in obtaining admission to a medical college.
(3) Being convicted of a felony or misdemeanor relating to a health profession
or receiving probation without verdict, disposition in lieu of trial or an
Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition in the disposition of felony charges.
(4) Having a license or other authorization to practice the profession revoked or
suspended or having other disciplinary action taken, or an application for a
license or other authorization refused, revoked or suspended by a proper
licensing authority.
(5) Being unable to practice the profession with reasonable skill and safety to
patients by reason of illness, addiction to drugs or alcohol or having been
convicted of a felony relating to a controlled substance.
(6) Violating a lawful regulation promulgated by the board or violating a lawful
order of the board previously entered by the board in a disciplinary proceeding.
(7) Knowingly maintaining a professional connection or association with any
person who is in violation of the MPA or board regulations or knowingly
aiding, assisting, procuring or advising any unlicensed person to practice a
profession contrary to the MPA or board regulations.
(8) Being guilty of immoral or unprofessional conduct.
(9) Acting in such manner as to present an immediate and clear danger to
public health or safety.
(10) Acting outside the scope of a license or certificate.
(11) Making a false or deceptive biennial registration with the board.
Id. § 422.41.
70. "Unprofessional conduct" includes, but is not limited to, the following:
(1) Revealing personally identifiable facts, obtained as the result of a physician-
patient relationship, without the prior consent of the patient, except as
authorized or required by statute.
(2) Violating a statute or regulation that imposes a standard for the practice of
medicine.
2004]
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49 of the Pennsylvania Code. In addition, the Board may issue a
temporary suspension against a physician who is determined to be "an
immediate and clear danger to the public health and safety., 72 Moreover,
any violation of the MPA may result in a fine, civil penalty, or
(3) Performing a medical act incompetently or by which the physician knows or
has reason to know that he/she is not competent to perform.
(4) Unconditionally guaranteeing that a cure will result from the performance
of medical services.
(5) Advertising of medical business which is intended to or has a tendency to
deceive the public.
(6) Practicing medicine fraudulently, or with reckless indifference to the
interests of a patient, or with negligence on repeated occasions.
(7) Practicing medicine while the ability to practice is impaired by alcohol,
drugs or physical or mental disability.
(8) Knowingly permitting, aiding or abetting a person who is not licensed or
certified, or exempt from license or certification requirements, to perform
activities requiring a license or certification.
(9) Continuing to practice while the physician's license has expired, is not
registered or is suspended or revoked.
(10) Impersonating another health-care practitioner.
(11) Possessing, using, prescribing for use or distributing a controlled substance
or a legend drug in a way other than for an acceptable medical purpose.
(12) Offering, undertaking or agreeing to cure or treat a disease by a secret
method, procedure, treatment or medicine, or the treating, operating or
prescribing for a human condition by a method, means or procedure which the
licensee refuses to divulge to the Board.
(13) Charging a patient or a third-party payor for a medical service not
performed.
(14) Delegating a medical responsibility to a person when the physician knows
or has reason to know that the person is not qualified.
(15) Failing to exercise appropriate supervision over a person who is authorized
to practice only under the supervision of the physician.
(16) Willfully harassing, abusing or intimidating a patient.
(17) Abandoning a patient.
(18) Failing to make available to a patient or to another designated health care
practitioner, upon a patient's written request, the patient's medical record,
which is in the possession or under the control of the physician, or failing to
complete the necessary forms or reports that are a precondition to the
reimbursement or direct payment of a patient's medical expenses by a third
party.
(19) Violating a provision of Chapter 16, 17 or 18 of the Pennsylvania Code.
49 PA. CODE § 16.6 1(a).
71. "Immoral conduct" includes, but is not linited to, the following:
(1) Misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact in obtaining a license to
practice medicine or a reinstatement thereof.
(2) The commission of an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or
corruption when the act directly or indirectly affects the health, welfare or
safety of citizens of this Commonwealth. If the act constitutes a crime,
conviction thereof in a criminal proceeding is not a condition precedent to
disciplinary action.
Id. § 16.61(b).
72. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 422.40(a).
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imprisonment.73
2. The MCARE Act: One Giant Leap towards a Systems-Based
Approach of Error Reduction
The purpose of the MCARE Act is to ensure that quality medical
care is made available to Pennsylvanians.74 The types of medical facility
entities that are required to comply with the MCARE Act are hospitals,
75
ambulatory surgical facilities, and birth centers.76  In carrying out this
function, medical professional liability insurance must be obtainable at
an affordable and reasonable cost. 7 7 Such insurance coverage is required
for physicians and hospitals in Pennsylvania 78 to fairly compensate
victims of medical malpractice. 79  However, paying for medical
professional liability insurance is becoming more and more expensive for
physicians and hospitals.80 For instance, health care providers must first
buy primary coverage from their own insurance companies and then are
required to participate in MCARE for secondary coverage. 81 The current
amounts of insurance coverage that MCARE provides are as follows:
$500,000 per occurrence or claim and $2,500,000 per annual aggregate
for hospitals, $1,000,000/$3,000,000 for nonparticipating health care
providers, and $500,000/$1,500,000 for all other health care providers.82
These amounts have increased drastically over the past several years83
73. Id. § 422.39.
74. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1303.102(1).
75. The hospitals that are included are "all entities licensed by the Department of
Health under the Health Care Facilities Act and by the Department of Public Welfare
under the Public Welfare Code (general and specific hospitals)." Robert A. Evarts, et al.,
Serious Event Reporting: How, When and Why to Notify the Department of Health
(2003), reprinted in PA. BAR INST. 9TH ANNUAL, HEALTH LAW INSTITUTE II, EE-4 (2003).
76. Id.
77. Id. § 1303.102(3).
78. Id. § 1303.71 1(a)(1),(2) (requiring that health care providers purchase medical
professional liability insurance or provide self-insurance).
79. Id. § 1303.102(4) (providing that "[a] person who has sustained injury or death
as a result of medical negligence by a health care provider must be afforded. .. fair
compensation").
80. See Hosp. & HEALTHSYS. Ass'N OF PA., supra note 2, at ].
81. Jennifer Nejman & Michelle Star, A Premium to Practice, Medical Errors, Big
Jury Awards and Falling Interest Rates are Blamed for Doctors' Rising Costs, YORK
DAILY REC., Dec. 18, 2003, available at http://ydr.com/story/malpractice/16764/ (last
visited June 20, 2004).
82. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1303.711 (d)(2).
83. Amendments to Act 111, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1301.101-1301.1006 (1975),
increased minimum basic malpractice insurance amounts from $200,000/$600,000 to
$300,000/$900,000 for policies written in years 1997-1998; $400,000/$1.2 million for
years 1999-2000 policies; and $500,000/$1.5 million for years 2001-2002. Rules and
Regulations, Title 49-Professional and Vocational Standards, State Board of Medicine,
Pa. Bull., available at http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol30/30-21/838.html (last
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and will be even higher after the year 2006.84 When MCARE's coverage
increases to higher base amounts, hospitals and physicians must obtain
additional primary coverage on their own.
The MCARE Act also requires that all efforts be made to reduce
and eliminate medical errors.85 Identifying problems and implementing
solutions that promote patient safety will effectively drive down
insurance rates.86 Reporting mechanisms have therefore been instituted
to help identify problem doctors.87 For example, physicians must report
any medical professional liability complaints received to the State Board
of Medicine. 88  Disciplinary actions taken against the physician by a
health care licensing authority of another state, or information regarding
the arrest" or sentencing 9° of a physician must also be reported to the
State Board of Medicine. 9' Once the Board receives notice of a
complaint, it has four years to complete an investigation.92 Additionally,
the Board typically has four years to commence an action against a
physician once it receives notice that: (1) "a payment against the
physician has been reported to the [NPDB];" (2) "a payment in a medical
professional liability action against the physician has been reported to the
licensure board by an insurer;" (3) a report was made regarding a
disciplinary action taken against the physician by a health care licensing
authority of another state; (4) a report was made regarding the sentencing
visited June 20, 2004).
84. With a few exceptions, the basic insurance coverage for policies issues or
renewed in 2006 will be: $750,000/$2,250,000 for a participating health care provider
that is not a hospital, $1,000,000/$3,000,000 for a nonparticipating health care provider,
and $750,000/$3,750,000 for a hospital. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1303.711(d)(3). For
policies issued or renewed in 2009 and for each year thereafter, the basic insurance
coverage will be (with a few exceptions): $1,000,000/$3,000,000 for a participating
health care provider that is not a hospital and for a nonparticipating health care provider
and $1,000,000/54,500,000 for a hospital. Id. § 1303.711 (d)(4).
85. Id. § 1303.102(5).
86. See id.
87. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1303.903.
88. Id.
89. The only arrests that must be reported include:
(i) 18 Pa.C.S. Ch. 25 (relating to criminal homicide);
(ii) 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702 (relating to aggravated assault);
(iii) 18 Pa.C.S. Ch. 31 (relating to sexual offenses); or
(iv) a violation of the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), known as The
Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act.
Id. § 1303.903(4)(i)-(iv).
90. The only sentencing that must be reported include: [i]nformation regarding
sentencing of the physician for an offense as provided in section 15 of the Act of October
5, 1978 (P.L. 1109, No. 261), known as the Osteopathic Medical Practice Act, or section
41 of the Act of December 20, 1985 (P.L. 457, No. 112), known as the Medical Practice
Act of 1985. Id. § 1303.903(3).
91. Id. § 1303.903.
92. Id. § 1303.904(a).
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of the physician for an offense provided by the Medical Practice Act of
1985; or (5) a report was made regarding an arrest of a physician for
criminal homicide, aggravated assault, or sexual offenses.93
Recent MCARE legislation has implemented stricter requirements
for institutional oversight of doctors by hospitals.94 The MCARE Act
now requires health care facilities to report serious events 95 and
incidents96 to a newly established independent state agency, known as the
Patient Safety Authority. 97 Infrastructure failures 98 must also be reported
within twenty-four hours of their discovery. 99 Hospitals are also required
to notify the affected patient or an adult family member within seven
days of the occurrence of any of these serious events or incidents. 100
Moreover, as of July 18, 2002, all medical facilities were required to
develop and implement an internal patient safety plan. 10 1 These patient
safety plans must designate a patient safety officer, 0 2 a patient safety
committee, 0 3 and establish a system for health care workers of the
93. Id. § 1303.904(b).
94. Seeid. §§ 1303.301-313.
95. See supra text accompanying note 16.
96. See supra text accompanying note 17.
97. Id. § 1303.308.
98. An infrastructure failure is defined as "an undesirable or unintended event,
occurrence or situation involving the infrastructure of a medical facility or the
discontinuation or significant disruption of a service which could seriously compromise
patient safety." Id. § 1303.302.
99. Id. § 1303.313.
100. Id. §§ 1303.301, 308.
101. Id. § 1303.307; see also Anna B. Torrance, Patient safety reporting
requirements, PHYSICIAN'S NEWS DIG., Sept. 2002, available at
http://www.physiciansnews.com/law/902torrance.html (last visited June 20, 2004).
102. A patient safety officer of a medical facility:
(1) Serve[s] on the patient safety committee;
(2) Ensure[s] the investigation of all reports of serious events and incidents;
(3) Takes such action as is immediately necessary to ensure patient safety as a
result of any investigation; [and]
(4) Report[s] to the patient safety committee any action taken to promote
patient safety as a result of investigations commenced.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1303.309.
103. A patient safety committee of medical facility:
(1) Receive[s] reports from the patient safety officer;
(2) Evaluate[s] investigations and actions of the patient safety officer on all
reports;
(3) Review[s] and evaluate[s] the quality of patient safety measures utilized by
the medical facility;
(4) Make[s] recommendations to eliminate future serious events and incidents;
[and]
(5) Report[s] to the administrative officer and governing body of the medical
facility on a quarterly basis the number of serious events and incidents and its
recommendations to eliminate future serious events and incidents.
Id. § 1303.310(b)(1)-(5).
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facility to report serious events and incidents. 10 4 Any failure of a medical
facility to develop and comply with the safety plan or to report a serious
event or incident violates the Healthcare Facilities Act and may be
subject to an administrative penalty of $1,000 per day.10 5 However, none
of the information prepared pursuant to the responsibilities of the patient
safety committee are admissible as evidence in any civil or
administration action or proceeding.10 6 Likewise, none of the individuals
who participate in the patient safety committee are required to testify as
to any matters within the knowledge gained as a result of the person's
participation on the committee.1
0 7
The Patient Safety Authority ("Authority"), which is composed of
an eleven member panel appointed by the Governor and legislature and
chaired by the Pennsylvania Physician General, is "charged with taking
steps to reduce and eliminate medical errors by identifying problems and
recommending solutions that promote patient safety in hospitals."'
10 8
Specifically, the Authority will:
contract with for-profit or registered nonprofit entities to ... collect,
analyze and evaluate data regarding reports of serious events and
incidents,... transmit to the authority recommendations for changes
in health care practices and procedures ... [and] advise reporting
medical facilities of immediate changes that could be instituted to
reduce serious events and incidents.1
0 9
Thereafter, the Authority must evaluate the recommendations made by
these entities, report on their findings to the Department of Health
("Department"), and issue recommendations to the medical facilities
regarding changes, trends, and improvements in health care practices and
procedures. °10 In order for the Authority to function properly, a Patient
Safety Trust Fund has also been established in which all medical
facilities are to annually pay the Department a surcharge on its licensing
fee.111
Nevertheless, despite additions made to the MCARE Act, they have
not solved the medical malpractice crisis that Pennsylvania is presently
experiencing. Perhaps one reason for this is that there simply has not
been enough time for the new MCARE provisions to work. Even so,
104. Id. § 1303.307(b)(1)-(3).
105. Id. § 1303.313(f).
106. Id. § 1303.311(h).
107. Id. § 1303.311(i).
108. Patient Safety Authority, available at http://www.psa.state.pa.us/psa/
site/default.asp (last visited June 20, 2004); see also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1303.304.
109. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1303.304(a)(5)(i)-(iii).
110. Id. §§ 1303.304(a)(6)-(7).
111. Id. § 1303.305.
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there is much room for improvement in strengthening the Patient Safety
Authority.
III. A Systems-Based Approach to Error Reduction: Why it is
Important and How it Works
The occurrence of medical errors is a significant problem.ll 2 Deaths
due to medical errors are among the top ten leading causes of death. 1 3
The total national cost for preventable adverse events is approximately
$29 billion. 14 The types of errors that may contribute to these fatalities,
which occur during the course of providing medical treatment, include
diagnostic errors, 1 5 treatment errors, 1t6 and preventative errors. 117 Other
types of errors, such as equipment failures and a failure to communicate,
may also occur." 8 It is therefore imperative to understand why medical
errors take place and to develop a methodology for identifying and
preventing errors from happening in the future. 1 9
Blaming someone for the occurrence of an error will not prevent the
same error from happening again 20 and will also slow progress in the
detection of errors.12 1  Progress will be slowed since "[e]rror
identification requires a comfortable and candid relationship among
members of a health care team, built on trust among members that errors
may be openly discussed without fear of sanction in all but the most
egregious cases."' 122  Accordingly, a systems-based approach to error
prevention and patient safety improvement is required in order to modify
the conditions that contribute to errors. 123
"This systems approach can be seen as a continuous process,
involving several integral stages with the underlying goal of preventing
errors ex ante. The stages of this error-reduction paradigm are in-process
112. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 13, at 1.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 27.
115. Diagnostic errors include: (1) error or delay in diagnosis; (2) failure to employ
indicated tests; (3) use of outmoded tests or therapy; and (4) failure to act on results of
monitoring. Id. at 36.
116. Treatment errors include: (1) error in the performance of an operation,
procedure, or test; (2) error in administering the treatment; error in the dose or method of
using a drug; (3) avoidable delay in treatment or in responding to an abnormal test; and
(4) inappropriate care. Id.
117. Preventative errors include: failure to provide prophylactic treatment and
inadequate or follow-up of treatment. Id.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 7.
120. Id. at 49.
121. Barry R. Furrow, Medical Mistakes: Tiptoeing Toward Safety, 3 Hous. J.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 181, 187 (2003).
122. Id.
123. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 13, at 49.
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detection, process change/design, and process reassessment. These
stages loop continuously for each detected error and intervention. 1 24 An
example of a systems-based approach to error reduction includes
designing safer systems for people using machines. 125 This may involve
redesigning machines to default to a safe mode or reducing the
difficulties of using multiple devices simultaneously. 126 Another method
used in a systems approach is to institute training and educational
programs in which risk prevention is taught.' 27 Moreover, forums may
be established to identify and communicate errors that occur so that
others may learn about them and take precautions in the future.
28
Implementing reporting requirements for the collection of adverse events
is another example of a systems-based approach. 129 One last example
includes developing systems to ensure medication safety. 3 ° Hence, it
seems clear that a systems-based approach is a valuable tool to help in
the battle of error reduction.
IV. Strengthening MCARE'S Patient Safety Authority
A. JCAHO: A Good Example of a Systems-Based Approach to Risk
Prevention
1. An Overview of JCAHO
The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations ("JCAHO") "is the world leader in evaluating the quality
and safety of care delivered in over 17,000 health care organizations
across the country-from hospitals to home care providers, nursing
homes, assisted living facilities, outpatient clinics, behavioral health
centers, critical access hospitals and health care networks.' 13 1 In order to
124. Liang, supra note 10, at 347.
125. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 13, at 62.
126. Id. Other examples include: minimizing the variety of equipment models
purchased and implementing clear procedures for checking equipment and supplies prior
to beginning surgery. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 9.
130. Id. at 182-83. Strategies to improve medication safety include: implementing
standard processes for medication doses, does timing, and dose scales; standardizing
prescription writing and prescribing rules; implementing physician order entry and unit
dosing; limiting the number of different kinds of common equipment; using
pharmaceutical software; and using special procedures for the use of high-risk
medications. Id.
131. The Joint Commission: Assessing the Quality of Care in Hospitals, JOINT
COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS. 2, available at http://www.jcaho.org/
[Vol. 109:1
TAKING PENNSYLVANIA OFF LIFE SUPPORT
earn accreditation from JCAHO, a medical facility must endure an
extensive on-sight review by a team of JCAHO professionals, such as
administrators, physicians, and nurses, at a minimum of once every three
years.132  Health care organizations become accredited once it is
determined that they have met JCAHO's standards. 1
33
2. JCAHO's Review Process
The primary purpose of JCAHO's review process is to assess the
medical facility's performance in the particular areas that affect their
care. 134  However, this is not the only task of JCAHO surveys. For
instance, so that health care organizations can improve, JCAHO's
surveyors also identify problem areas and provide education and
consultation. 135 Additionally, JCAHO surveys performance areas such as
infection control, emergency management, human resources and
performance improvement. 136  Lastly, JCAHO surveys patient rights
standards, infection control standards, pain management standards,
environment of care standards, and restraint and seclusion standards.'
37
3. JCAHO Accreditation
JCAHO accreditation surveys are purely voluntary and notice is
announced to a medical institution prior to when the survey is given.1
38
Before JCAHO will permit a survey of a medical facility, the facility
accredited+organizations/publicizing+your+accreditation/hospital+brochure.pdf (last
visited June 20, 2004). Ambulatory care organizations, clinical laboratories, and office-
based surgery practices may also become accredited by JCAHO. How to Become
Accredited, JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., available at
http://www.jcaho.comlhtba/index.htm (last visited June 20, 2004).
132. The Joint Commission: Assessing the Quality of Care in Hospitals, supra note
131, at 2. Laboratories must be surveyed every two years. Facts about the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, supra note 21.
133. JCAHO's standards are developed by health care experts, providers,
measurement experts, purchasers, and consumers. Facts about the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, supra note 21.
134. What is the Joint Commission of Healthcare Organizations, JOINT COMM'N ON
ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., available at http://www.jcaho.com/general
+public/who+jc/index.htm (last visited June 20, 2004).
135. How to Become Accredited, JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE
ORGS., at http://www.jcaho.com/htba/index.htm (last visited June 20, 2004).
136. Frequently Asked Questions about the Joint Commission, supra note 20.
137. Setting the Standard: The Joint Commission & Health Care Safety and Quality,
JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., available at
http://www.jcaho.org/general+public/patient+safety/settingthe-standard.pdf (iast visited
June 20, 2004).
138. See Frequently Asked Questions About Hospital Surveys, JOINT COMM'N ON
ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., available at http://www.jcaho.org/accredited+
organizations/hospitals/faqs/ (last visited June 20, 2004).
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must be in compliance with an initial survey for at least four months and
one year on a resurvey.1 39  Although surveys are only required once
every three years for a health care organization to maintain its
accreditation status, JCAHO requires a mid-cycle, periodic performance
review during which health care organizations must evaluate their own
compliance with applicable standards and develop a plan of action for
identified areas of non-compliance.140  Additionally, JCAHO has
implemented a system so that medical facilities may participate in
continuous accreditation efforts to monitor and improve their daily
performance, and not just in preparation of a survey. 14 1 This is a very
valuable tool since medical facilities will know whether their
performance efforts are functioning at any time during the accreditation
cycle. 1
42
Once a survey is complete, if full accreditation143 is not given to a
particular health care organization, lesser forms of accreditation may be
given. 44  These include provisional, 45 preliminary, 14 6 or conditional
accreditation. 147  The different types of accreditation denials include
preliminary denial of accreditation, 148  accreditation denied, 149 and
accreditation watch.15 0  These categories of accreditation or non-
139. Id.
140. Facts about Shared Visions-New Pathways, JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION
OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., available at http://www.jcaho.com/accredited+organizations/
svnp/svnp+facts.htm (last visited June 20, 2004).
141. See Frequently Asked Questions About Hospital Surveys, supra note 138.
142. Id.
143. Full accreditation "indicates that an organization is in compliance with all
applicable standards at the time of the on-site survey or has successfully addressed all
survey recommendations in its Evidence of Standards Compliance within 30 days after
survey." Accreditation Decisions, JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE
ORGS., available at http://www.jcaho.com/accredited+organizations/publicizing+your+
accreditation/accreditation+decisions.htm (last visited June 20, 2004).
144. Id.
145. "A provisional accreditation decision results when an organization fails to meet
all of the survey recommendations in its Evidence of Standards Compliance within 30
days after survey." Id.
146. A preliminary accreditation "indicates that an organization has demonstrated
substantial compliance with the selected structural standards used in the first of two
surveys conducted under the Early Survey Policy Option 1." Id.
147. Conditional accreditation "indicates that substantial compliance deficiencies
exist in an organization." Id.
148. A preliminary denial of accreditation occurs "when an organization is found to
be in significant noncompliance with Joint Commission standards or when its
accreditation is preliminary withdrawn by the Joint Commission for other reasons (e.g.,
falsification of information)." Id.
149. "A denied accreditation decision results when an organization does not achieve
accreditation or when accreditation is withdrawn by the Joint Commission." Id.
150. "An organization is placed on accreditation watch when a sentinel event has
occurred and a thorough and credible root cause analysis of the sentinel event and an
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accreditation basically function as a way of letting the public know
exactly where health care organizations stand with JCAHO and what
needs to be improved in order to receive full accreditation.151
4. JCAHO's Reporting Mechanisms
JCAHO understands the importance of a systems-based approach to
error prevention, which is why it has implemented a variety of methods
in order to achieve a significant reduction of medical errors during and
after surveys are completed.' 52 Such methods consist of (1) identifying
resulting errors; (2) analyzing errors to determine their underlying
causes; (3) compiling data regarding error frequency; (4) disseminating
information pertaining to these errors to health care organizations so that
they may redesign their systems to help eliminate the risk of future
errors; and (5) periodically assessing the effectiveness of the risk
prevention efforts taken. 153 Although accredited JCAHO members are
not obliged to perform all of these reporting mechanisms, JCAHO
requires that sentinel events are reported. 154  "A sentinel event is an
unexpected occurrence involving death or serious physical-including
loss of limb or function-or psychological injury, or the risk thereof."' 55
Health care organizations must "complete a thorough and credible root
cause analysis, implement improvements to reduce risk, and monitor the
effectiveness of those improvements" whenever a sentinel event
occurs. 156
5. Tailoring Pursuant to a Medical Facility's Needs and Desires
Because each health care organization has different goals and
objectives, JCAHO also provides helpful tips on how these organizations
can select a particular performance measurement system that best
identifies their individual needs. 57  JCAHO also suggests that when
action plan have not been completed within a specified time frame." Id.
151. Id.
152. Reporting of Medical/Health Care Errors, JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF
HEALTHCARE ORGS., at http://www.jcaho.com/accredited+organizations/patient+safety/
medical+errors+disclosure/index.htm (last visited June 20, 2004).
153. Id.
154. Facts About Patient Safety, JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE
ORGS., available at http://www.jcaho.org/accredited+organizations/patient+safety/
facts+about+patient+safety.htm#2 (last visited June 20, 2004). "'Risk thereof means
that, although no harm occurred this time, any recurrence would carry a significant
chance of a serious adverse outcome." Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. How to Select a Performance Measurement System, JOINT COMM'N ON
ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., available at http://www.jcaho.com/
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these organizations monitor their own activities, they develop a scoring
system which weighs its desirable criteria according to their
importance. 1
58
6. The Role of JCAHO's Advisory Boards in Facilitating
Ongoing Improvements
In a continuous effort to improve the safety and quality of care
provided to the public, JCAHO is also composed of numerous advisory
groups that provide it with feedback in order to help further create and
modify standards, policies, and procedures that support error reduction in
health care organizations.1 59 These groups include: Program Advisory
Councils, Advisory Council on Performance Measurement, Business
Advisory Groups, Committee on Health Care Safety, Core Measures
Advisory Panels, Infection Expert Panel, Liaison Network, Nursing
Advisory Council, Professional and Technical Advisory Committees,
Public Advisory Group, Sentinel Event Alert Advisory Group, and Work
Group on Accreditation Issues for Small/Rural Hospitals.'
60
The recently established Shared Visions-New Pathways initiative is
one example of how some of the advisory boards have helped make
improvements to JCAHO. 161 Under this new program, JCAHO standards
will be significantly consolidated to facilitate a reduction of the
paperwork and documentation burden on the currently existing
accreditation process.1 62 Moreover, a new software application has been
developed that will draw information from several sources in an attempt
to identify priority areas that help focus the on-site survey.1
6 3
B. Why the Current Patient Safety Authority is Lacking and How it Can
be Strengthened
Health care organizations in Pennsylvania need to be given an
incentive to develop and maintain a patient safety plan. By mandating
accredited+organizations/hospitals/oryx/system+selection/index.htm (last visited June 20,
2004).
158. Id. JCAHO suggests using a six-point system in which 5 is "Fully Meets," 4 is
"Substantially Meets," 3 is "Partially Meets," 2 is "Minimally Meets," 1 is "Will Meet,"
and 0 is "Does Not Meet." Id.
159. Facts about Joint Commission Advisory Groups, JOINT COMM'N ON
ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., available at http://www.jcaho.com/
about+us/advisory+ groups/index.htm (last visited June 20, 2004).
160. Id.
161. Facts about Shared Visions -New Pathways, JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION
OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., available at http://www.jcaho.com/accredited+organizations/
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that all medical facilities develop such a plan and by imposing a
significant fine if they fail to do so, 164 the MCARE Act has done a good
job in providing such an incentive. However, much more can be done.
Medical facilities need to know that they are constantly at risk for being
audited to determine whether they have complied with their patient
safety plans and whether the plans are working. The Patient Safety
Authority should act as a "quasi-public deputy" in policing health care
organizations to carry out its functions. If the Authority acts as an
auditor by using a surprise-basis technique, health care organizations will
be required to continuously ensure that they are in compliance with their
patient safety goals and objectives. If they are not in compliance, serious
sanctions should result.
Accordingly, since JCAHO is the nation's leader in evaluating the
quality and safety of health care organizations, 165 Pennsylvania should
look to it for guidance in strengthening its Patient Safety Authority. To
begin with, MCARE should expand to cover more medical facilities than
it currently covers. Whereas JCAHO accredits a wide variety of health
care organizations, 66 the only medical facilities that are required to
comply with the MCARE Act are hospitals,1 67 ambulatory surgical
facilities, and birth centers. 168 Currently, the Patient Safety Provisions of
MCARE do not cover long-term care nursing facilities, home health care
agencies, or cancer treatment centers. 169 Because medical errors can
occur at these medical facilities as well, they must also be subject to the
new MCARE provisions. Thus, new provisions should be implemented
so that all types of health care organizations are covered under MCARE.
Pennsylvania's Patient Safety Authority should also implement
procedures by which it would survey performance areas, just as JCAHO
has done.' 70  Presently, MCARE simply mandates the Authority to
"[c]ollect, analyze and evaluate data regarding reports of serious events
and incidents."' 7' There is nothing in the MCARE legislation which
requires the Authority to inspect, for example, infection control,
emergency management, pain management, or environment of care
standards. By surveying these areas, the Authority would be able to
identify potential problem areas within a medical facility that are not
necessarily reported as a serious event or incident.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 101-105.
165. See supra text accompanying note 131.
166. See supra text accompanying note 131.
167. Evarts, supra note 75, at EE-4.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Frequently Asked Questions about the Joint Commission, supra note 20.
171. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1303.3 0 4(a)(5)(i).
2004]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
Moreover, the Patient Safety Authority can also help to improve the
patient safety plans that hospitals, ambulatory surgical facilities, and
birthing centers are required to have in place. 172 Presently, the
Pennsylvania Department of Health only conducts licensure surveys of
hospitals once every two years. 73 Although this is better than JCAHO's
requirement of once every three years, Pennsylvania would fare well by
instituting some of the additional requirements that JCAHO provides
during the intermittence of the survey period. For example, as already
stated, JCAHO has implemented a system by which health care facilities
may participate in ongoing accreditation efforts to monitor and improve
their performance every day, and not just in preparation of a survey.
174
Although MCARE does this by requiring the Patient Safety Committee
to make ongoing safety improvements, 75 it does not require the JCAHO
suggestion for medical facilities to develop a scoring system that weighs
its desirable criteria according to their importance. 176 A new provision
should be added to the MCARE Act that requires all patient safety plans
to include a system that would allow medical facilities to track their
progress on a continuous basis. By doing this, these health care facilities
would know at any time how well their performance efforts are working.
Perhaps these facilities should also be required to submit quarterly,
biannual, or annual reports to the Patient Safety Authority to enable a
review of the performance of these facilities.
When medical facilities are surveyed by the Department of Health,
rather than just renewing a particular facility's license or citing a facility
for a reporting violation, it may also be a good idea for the Department
of Health to rate a facility on how well it is performing, in comparison to
other health care facilities. For instance, JCAHO not only awards full
accreditation to a particular health care organization, but lesser forms of
accreditation may also be given, including provisional, preliminary, or
conditional accreditation. 77  These ratings are then posted on its
website. 78 If the Department of Health implemented a mechanism such
as this, it would give hospitals and other medical facilities a greater
incentive to comply with the new MCARE provisions relating to patient
safety since they would not want to be listed as having a so-called
substandard licensure status.
The Patient Safety Authority's top priority, however, should
172. See Evarts, supra note 75, at EE-4.
173. HEALTH CARE FACILITY ACT, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 809(a)(1)(i) (2003).
174. Frequently Asked Questions about Hospital Surveys, supra note 138.
175. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1303.3 10.
176. See How to Select a Performance Measurement System, supra note 157.
177. Accreditation Decisions, supra note 143.
178. Id.
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comprise of developing techniques to reduce medical errors, rather than
simply focusing on reporting requirements by the various Pennsylvania
health care facilities. The Authority will be able to determine what the
most frequently occurring serious events and incidents are based on the
mandatory reporting requirements. These reporting requirements will
allow the Authority to study why these events and incidents are taking
place. Once there is an understanding of why particular medical errors
are occurring, the Authority will then be able to implement particular
procedures that health care facilities can follow in order to prevent such
errors from occurring in the future. Some of these preventative
techniques may simply involve ensuring that nurses and doctors are
taking the proper preparatory and clean-up procedures, such as making
sure that health care workers wash their hands before beginning a
medical procedure or verifying that all medical instruments are removed
from a patient's stomach. Perhaps these simple errors could be reduced
by teaching risk prevention through training and education programs.179
However, other preventative techniques may involve more complex
procedures. For instance, the reports that the Authority receives from
Pennsylvania medical facilities may indicate that errors are occurring due
to particular system failures and, thus, safer systems may need to be
designed. This may consist of redesigning machines to default to a safe
mode or reducing the complexity of using numerous devices at the same
time. 180 Therefore, the reporting requirements are an important part of
this process in detecting why the errors are occurring in the first place.
Pennsylvania's MCARE Act was correct in refusing to allow any of
the information prepared pursuant to the responsibilities of the patient
safety committee as evidence in any civil or administration action or
proceeding.181  Likewise, it was correct by not requiring any of the
individuals who participate in the committee to testify as to any
information gained as a result of the person's participation in the
committee.182  "[A]ddressing medical errors will only work in a
confidential manner."'8 3 Dr. John Combes, senior medical advisor at the
Hospital and Healthsystem Association of Pennsylvania, has remarked
that "[t]he best way to ... [address medical errors] is in an open,
179. See The Joint Commission: Assessing the Quality of Care in Hospitals, supra
text accompanying note 131.
180. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 13, at 62.
181. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1303.311(h).
182. Id. § 1303.311(i).
183. Luis Fabregas, Bill May Keep Hospital Data Under Wraps, PITTSBURGH
TRIBUNE-REVIEW, Dec. 14, 2003, available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/tribune-
review/sports/tribune-review/news/s_169998.html (last visited June 20, 2004) (citing Dr.
John Combes, senior medical advisor at the Hospital and Healthsystem Association of
Pennsylvania).
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nonpunitive, voluntary system so experts can learn from the inevitable
errors that occur and learn how to prevent harm from errors. 184
Although Pennsylvania's recently implemented MCARE legislation
regarding patient safety is a good start in helping to reduce medical
errors by using a systems-based approach, it should implement some of
the additional procedures that JCAHO uses in evaluating the quality and
safety of care of its member facilities. By doing this, Pennsylvania
would be well on its way to creating a safer environment for health care
facilities. As a result, these facilities would also be less prone to medical
errors.
There are several reasons why a more aggressive Patient Safety
Authority would be a preferable solution to Pennsylvania's current crisis.
For instance, JCAHO surveys are only conducted once every three years
and health care facilities are given advance notice to when these surveys
will take place. 185 The Patient Safety Authority could instead require
surveys to be conducted on a "surprise-basis" at least once every year.
Although the Pennsylvania Department of Health has the power to enter
and inspect hospitals and hospital documents, there is no requirement
that the inspections take place on any regular basis.186 By conducting
surveys more frequently, errors will be found faster, which will enable
the Authority to quickly develop preventative measures to help reduce
similar errors from taking place in the future. Thus, the sooner errors are
detected, the sooner preventative measures can be implemented, which
will inevitably result in a reduction of future medical errors. This will
likewise result in the filing of fewer claims. Moreover, performing
surveys on a "surprise-basis," instead of planned visits, will give
hospitals and other medical facilities a greater incentive to ensure that
their patient safety plans are in place and working at all times, rather than
just trying to get their plans in motion in preparation of a scheduled
survey once every three years, which is all that JCAHO requires.1
8 7
In addition, one study found that JCAHO accredited hospitals
reported more medical errors to state agencies than to JCAHO when
reporting was mandatory by the states.188 This further demonstrates why
the Authority's reporting requirements are so important. There is a
greater likelihood of determining what the root cause of a particular
medical error is when more reports are filed. Perhaps a common theme
could be established regarding certain medical errors based upon the
184. Id.
185. See Frequently Asked Questions About Hospital Surveys, supra note 138.
186. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 448.813.
187. See Frequently Asked Questions About Hospital Surveys, supra note 138.
188. Williams, L.K., Pladevall, M., et al., Differences in the Reporting of Care-
Related Patient Injuries to Existing Reporting Systems 460-76 (2003).
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reports filed. For example, if there are more reports relating to specific
medical errors, researchers may be able to make comparisons among the
reports filed and determine why these errors are occurring.
Moreover, by implementing stricter requirements for the Patient
Safety Authority, it will be able to tailor its procedures to the particular
needs of Pennsylvania health care facilities and focus all of its attention
in figuring out ways that errors can be reduced in Pennsylvania. If
JCAHO accreditation is all that is required, there will likely be many
errors that remain undetected. This is because JCAHO's primary goal is
not a reduction of errors in Pennsylvania, but rather, its objective is to
reduce errors in health care facilities across the nation.' 89 Thus, because
JCAHO's focus is not primarily on Pennsylvania, it is not as familiar
with the unique problems or systems errors that Pennsylvania medical
facilities are facing. Conversely, the Patient Safety Authority would be
able to reduce this state's problems and errors since all its efforts would
be focused solely on Pennsylvania.
However, because virtually all hospitals voluntarily seek JCAHO
approval, 90 JCAHO and MCARE should be coordinated to achieve
greater efficiency. Since the Department of Health has authority to rely
on private accreditation organizations, 19 MCARE should rely on
JCAHO's compliance checks and required notifications to satisfy some
of what MCARE might check for or require notification of.
Additionally, coordination of MCARE and JCAHO is important
regardless of whether it is too soon to tell how effective MCARE is or is
not. By recognizing any potential holes in the MCARE system now, in
comparison to the more time-tested JCAHO system, Pennsylvania would
be identifying potential problems that could occur in the future. Now is
the time to begin imagining how to fill any likely holes in MCARE so
that Pennsylvania is prepared if and when it discovers that problems
materialize with MCARE in the near future.
Accordingly, the best solution to reducing medical errors in
Pennsylvania is to institute more rigorous procedures for the Patient
Safety Authority to follow. While it may be expensive in the beginning
to fund the Authority, it will pay off in the long-run when medical errors
are reduced and fewer claims are filed.
189. See The Joint Commission: Assessing the Quality of Care in Hospitals, supra
note 131, at 2.
190. See The Joint Commission: Assessing the Quality of Care in Hospitals, supra
note 131, at 2.
191. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 448.103.
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V. Fairness Considerations
A. What "Fairness" Means and Why it is Important
Fairness is a vital factor that must be taken into account in resolving
the present medical malpractice crisis. 192 A recent study funded by Pew
Charitable Trusts 193 found that "the fairer the changes, the more likely
that they will be both significant and substantial." 194 This is a logical
observation because fair reforms are unlikely to be successfully disputed
on constitutional grounds or to be criticized by the public. 95
B. Finding a System that is Fair to Everyone is Crucial
The key to fairness in medical malpractice is to ensure that injured
patients are adequately compensated for their injuries, as well as to
ensure that doctors who are found liable for malpractice are held
accountable for their wrongful acts. 196  Unfortunately, what may be
perceived as fair to a malpractice victim is likely to be perceived as
unfair to health care providers and vice versa. Recommended solutions
that simply address the fairness to one of these parties while completely
ignoring the other side will ultimately have devastating effects.'
97
Alternatively, "changes in the malpractice system that are perceived as
unfair to malpractice victims could make patients distrustful of providers
and cynical about the political process that adopted and implemented the
so-called reforms."' 98 Thus, the trick is to find a middle-ground that
balances these competing interests.
192. See MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN, RESOLVING THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS:
FAIRNESS CONSIDERATIONS 1 (2003). It is generally accepted that fairness is an important
attribute of a properly functioning system of medical liability. Fairness is both a
legitimate objective in itself and a means of achieving important social goals, such as
preserving patient-provider relationships and maintaining confidence in courts and
legislatures. If changes to the malpractice system are viewed as fair, they are more likely
to be enacted. Id.
193. Pew Charitable Trusts is a non-profit organization that has invested $3.2 million
to research medical liability in Pennsylvania. Pew Trusts Invest $3.2 Million to Research
Medical Liability in Pennsylvania and Identify Possible Reforms, Pew Charitable Trusts,
Mar. 15, 2002, available at http://www.pewtrusts.com/news/news-subpage.cfm?
contentitem id=986&content-type-id = 16&page=nrl (last visited June 20, 2004).
194. MEHLMAN, supra note 190, at 14.
195. See id.
196. Id. at 1.
197. See id. at 13 (For example, "[c]omplaining of unfairness, health care
professionals may refuse to treat high risk populations, abandon certain specialty
practices or geographic areas, or act in other ways that are not in the patients' best
interests, such as by being wary of patients or practicing medicine defensively.").
198. Id. at 13.
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1. Unfair & Inadequate Solutions that WILL NOT Work
a. The "Shaming and Blaming" of Physicians
The traditional method of risk prevention in the medical profession
is to blame individual physicians for the medical errors that occur. 199
Certainly, medical malpractice litigation is a valuable compensatory and
quality-improvement tool for victims of medical malpractice. However,
relying on this approach as the predominant means of preventing future
medical errors is simply inadequate. 200 "By attempting to shame an
individual into believing that an error indicates lack of professionalism,
competence, and even the right to treat patients, this traditional medical
effort does not recognize the systems-based nature of successful error
reduction or outcomes."'2°  Under the current system of blaming
particular health care providers for acts of medical negligence, the focus
is on preventing those individual practitioners from repeating the same
errors.20 2 Unfortunately, system assessments are not made in order to
detect the underlying and root causes of these medical errors.203
Moreover, errors may occur that are not litigated since many injured
persons never sue and when malpractice action does arise, it is only
when it causes an injury.20 4 Thus, it is likely that those errors will also
remain unexplored. This is not the fairest solution for patients since
errors will remain undetected, thus giving rise to additional medical
errors resulting in the future.
b. A "No-Fault" System
A no-fault approach to medical malpractice is likewise an
inadequate solution to lowering premiums by improving the quality of
medical care. Under the no-fault approach, a blameless system for
compensating medical injuries is used.20 5 "[P]atients would be entitled to
compensation whenever they suffer a significant disability caused by
their medical treatment-irrespective of whether the treatment was
199. Liang, supra note 10, at 348.
200. John V. Jacobi & Nicole Huberfeld, Quality Control, Enterprise Liability, and
Disintermediation in Managed Care, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 305 (2001).
201. Liang, supra note 10, at 348.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Jacobi & Huberfeld, supra note 193, at 305.
205. No-Fault Compensation for Medical Injury Proposed as Incentive for Reporting
and Correcting Hospital Error, Improving Patient Safety, HARVARD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC
HEALTH, Jul. 10, 2001, available at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/press/releases/
press0710200I.html (last visited June 20, 2004).
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negligent., 20 6 Cost savings will not result in a no-fault system since any
savings realized from malpractice litigation will be used to compensate a
greater number of people.20 7 A no-fault system would also be expensive
and there would be a rise in the number of claims filed.208 An increased
number of claimants would result since negligence need not be
established to pursue a claim under the no-fault system; rather, only an
adverse result would be required.20 9  Additionally, a study conducted
several years ago predicted that a no-fault system would cost $800
million more than the current system.210 This increased cost is due to
both the higher number of claims filed and the resulting cost of
211administration. Moreover, it is unlikely that error prevention will
result under a no-fault system since "there is no claims review of
performance. ' '21 2 Instead, the only matter of concern under no-fault is
"whether the case meets the conditions for coverage." 213 Thus, since
neither a reduction of errors nor a reduction in malpractice claims will
occur with a no-fault approach, it also seems like an unfair method in
resolving Pennsylvania's current crisis.
c. "Beefing up" the State Board of Medicine
It has been argued that Pennsylvania is experiencing more of a
malpractice crisis than most other states because the State Board of
Medicine is doing a lax job in disciplining its health care providers.21 4
The Pennsylvania Medical Board is charged with regulating the practice
of medicine through the licensure, registration, and certification of
medical doctors, physician assistants, radiology technicians, respiratory
care practitioners, nurse-midwives, and acupuncturists. The Board
206. Paul C. Weiler, The Case for No-Fault Medical Liability, 52 MD. L. REV. 908,
919-920 (1993).
207. See Miles J. Zaremski & David J. Schwartz, The Legal Implications of Health
Care Cost Containment: A Symposium: Commentary: Finding Fault with "No Fault," 36
CASE W. RES. 1107, 1113 (1986); Weiler, supra note 206, at 926.
208. Zaremski & Schwartz, supra note 207, at 1112.
209. Id.
210. Id. (citing Zaremski & Weibel, There Is No Answer to the Medical Malpractice
Crisis, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 265 (1985)).
211. Id.
212. Randall R. Bovbjerg & Frank A. Sloan, No-Fault for Medical Injury: Theory
and Evidence, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 53, 109 (1998).
213. Id.
214. See Ranking of State Medical Board Serious Disciplinary Actions in 2002,
PUBLIC CITIZEN, available at http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7234
(last visited June 20, 2004).
215. State Board of Medicine Mission Statement, PA. DPT. OF ST., available at
http://www.dos.state.pa.us/bpoa/cwp/view.asp?a=1 104 &q=432799 (last visited June 20,
2004).
[Vol. 109:1
TAKING PENNSYLVANIA OFF LIFE SUPPORT
also has authority to take disciplinary or corrective action against the
individuals it regulates.2 16 Despite this authority, however, Pennsylvania
ranks among the ten worst medical review boards in the nation. 217 The
State Board of Medicine rarely issues sanctions against the physicians
that they have received complaints about.218 Public Citizen, a non-profit
organization that has represented consumer interests for the past three
decades, warns that the Pennsylvania State Board of Medicine is
"dangerously lenient with doctors, repeatedly letting serious and
sometimes repeat offenders off the hook. ''219  The group ranked
Pennsylvania 4 3 rd in the nation for taking serious disciplinary actions
against its doctors in 2002.220 One reason for this low ranking is that
Pennsylvania had a serious disciplinary rate of only 2.10 serious actions
per 1,000 doctors, while several other states had a ranking of over four
times that amount .22 Another reason for the low ranking is that of the
543 doctors who were responsible for 23.8 percent of all the money paid
out in malpractice cases, only 5.1 percent had been disciplined by the
Pennsylvania State Board of Medicine. 2
Moreover, according to Public Citizen's analysis of the federal
government's National Practitioner Data Bank ("NPDB"), 223 84 percent
of all the money paid out in medical malpractice cases is attributable to
216. See supra text accompanying notes 68-75.
217. See Ranking of State Medical Board Serious Disciplinary Actions in 2002, supra
note 212; see also Consumers Have Resources Available on Doctors, BEAUFORT
GAZETTE, Aug. 17, 2003 (finding that serious disciplinary actions include: license
revocations, surrenders, suspensions and probation/restrictions), available at
http://www.beaufortgazette.com/features/features-columns/cathy-harley/story/2778845p
-2575165c.html (last visited June 20, 2004).
218. PUBLIC CITIZEN, MEDICAL MISDIAGNOSIS IN PENNSYLVANIA: CHALLENGING THE
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS OF THE DOCTORS' LOBBY 3 (2003) (citing Relationship
Between Frequency of Physician Medical Malpractice Payment Reports and Reportable
Licensure Actions, Sept. 1, 1990 - Sept. 30, 2002, NAT'L PRACTITIONER DATA BANK),
available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/PARevisedFinal-Report.pdf (last
visited June 20, 2004).
219. Id. at 3.
220. Id. According to Public Citizen, Pennsylvania handed out 82 disciplinary
actions in 2002 out of 39,052 doctors, which is less than 1 percent. Sharon Smith, Health
Care Drug Abuse Problematic: Many Doctors and Pharmacists Caught Abusing are
Given a Second Chance, YORK DAILY REC., Sept. 11, 2003, available at
http://ydr.com/story/pain/1 3222/ (last visited June 20, 2004).
221. Ranking of State Medical Board Serious Disciplinary Actions in 2002, supra
note 212, at 1-2. Wyoming had a serious disciplinary rate of 11.87 per 1,000 physicians,
North Dakota had a rate of 8.76, and Alaska had a rate of 8.57. Id.
222. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 218, at 3.
223. The NPDB is a comprehensive database that collects information on both
physician disciplinary proceedings and malpractice claim payments. National
Practitioner Data Bank, available at http://www.npdb-hipdb.com/npdb.html (last visited
June 20, 2004). The names of individual physicians are not made available to the public.
See id.
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just 10.6 percent of Pennsylvania's physicians.224 In addition, only 4.7
percent of the state's doctors were responsible for more than 50 percent
of all the money paid out in malpractice cases. 5 While Pennsylvania is
home to only about 5 percent of the nation's doctors, they make up
almost 20 percent of American doctors with five or more malpractice
payments. 226  Nonetheless, the vast majority of the doctors who are
responsible for the payouts go unpunished. 7
Consequently, Public Citizen has argued that "beefing up" the
state's medical board by implementing more stringent disciplinary
procedures provides an optimal solution to Pennsylvania's malpractice
crisis. 228 However, Public Citizen may have overestimated the allegedly
high rate of malpractice payouts that are attributed to Pennsylvania
doctors. For instance, Public Citizen states that 10.63 percent of
Pennsylvania doctors have made two or more payouts. 229  However,
every time there is a payout in Pennsylvania, there may be two reports
filed.230  This is because "[t]wo reports are filed with the NPDB (one
from the primary insurer and one from the [MCARE] fund) whenever a
total malpractice settlement or award exceeds a maximum set by the
State for the practitioner's primary malpractice insurer. '2 31 The NPDB
has taken account for this difference in its studies by adjusting the
number of reports filed to exclude reports from Pennsylvania's patient
compensation "which make payments in excess of amounts paid by a
practitioner's primary malpractice carrier." 232 A review of the NPDB's
data regarding the number of reports compared to the adjusted number of
reports of all states shows that the numerical difference between these
two reports is the largest in Pennsylvania. 233 Because it does not appear
that Public Citizen is taking into account the adjusted number of reports,
224. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 218, at 2.
225. Id.
226. Sidney Wolfe, A Free Ride for Bad Doctor, PUBLIC CITIZEN, Mar. 4, 2003,
available at http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7232&seclD= 1158&
catlD=126 (last visited June 20, 2004).
227. See id. Although every private payout should not necessarily result in a public
sanction of a doctor's license, many should. It is unfair for the doctors that are not
responsible for the payouts to suffer the consequences of higher premiums resulting from
the small percentage of doctors who are responsible for multiple malpractice payouts.
228. Stopping Repeat Offenders: The Key to Cutting Medical Malpractice Costs,
PUBLIC CITIZEN (2002), available at http://citizen.org/congress/
civjus/medmal/articles.cfm? ID=8308 (last visited June 20, 2004).
229. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 218, at 13.
230. See NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, U.S. DEPT. OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVICES ADMIN. T.6, available at
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the percentage of Pennsylvania physicians making two or more
malpractice payouts may actually be much lower than 10.63 percent.
Additionally, the NPDB and Public Citizen tables regarding the
number of malpractice payouts differ in that Public Citizen uses the
figure "two or more," while the NPDB just uses the figure "two"
payment reports for each physician.234 Thus, a comparison between the
percentage of Pennsylvania doctors making two or more payouts and that
of the national average cannot be accurately drawn. Since there will
inevitably be more doctors in Pennsylvania that have made two or more
payouts versus just two payouts, it would be inaccurate to compare
Public Citizen's findings to the NPDB's national average findings.
Finally, the years used in calculating Public Citizen's data and the
NPDB's data differ. Whereas the NPDB uses an eleven year span,
2 35
236
Public Citizen uses only a ten year span in making its calculations.
Indeed, the resulting percentage of physicians making payouts will be
lower when the number of payouts reported is divided by eleven, rather
than ten.
Despite these inaccuracies, however, other reasons exist for why
beefing up the State Board of Medicine does not present the optimal
solution to Pennsylvania's crisis. For example, the Medical Board does
not have jurisdiction over other members of the health care community,
such as pharmacists and hospital CEOs. Merely disciplining the health
care providers that the Board has control over presents the same problem
that the medical liability system has in "shaming and blaming" so-called
"negligent" doctors. That is, the underlying and root causes of the
medical errors remain undetected with this system. Rather, only the
health care providers that allegedly committed a particular negligent act
will be disciplined. Even if the Board has the authority to engage in risk
prevention techniques by hiring investigators to identify the medical
errors that have taken place, because it does not have jurisdiction over all
health care providers, it will not be able to enforce error reduction to
those health care providers not under its control. Therefore,
implementing a more rigorous State Board of Medicine does not provide
the best solution.
234. See PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 218, at 13; NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA
BANK 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 230, at T.20.
235. The eleven year span starts on September 1, 1990 and ends on December 31,
2001. See NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 230,
at T.20.
236. Public Citizen's ten year span stops in 2000, rather than 2001. See PUBLIC
CITIZEN, supra note 218, at 13.
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2. A Fair Solution that WILL Work
To get to the crux of Pennsylvania's medical malpractice problem,
the implementation of a more aggressive Patient Safety Authority is the
best solution. Clifford A. Rieders, former President of the Pennsylvania
Trial Lawyers Association (PaTLA), has correctly pointed out that
"[c]ontrolling medical errors... is the only answer" for risk
prevention. 237  In fact, one state shows that proper use of a risk
management program, much like Pennsylvania's newly created Patient
Safety Authority, will work.23 s
In 1998, Massachusetts adopted a law, similar to MCARE's new
law, which requires all hospitals and other health care providers to
participate in "risk management programs" to review past performance
and prevent future harm to patients. 39  Parallel to the creation of the
Patient Safety Authority to carry out Pennsylvania's risk prevention law,
Massachusetts created the Coalition for the Prevention of Medical
Errors. 240 The Coalition's goal is to "disseminate knowledge and
information about the causes of sentinel events and develop strategies for
prevention. ' '24 1  In response to a growing concern regarding medical
errors by the public, health care providers, the media, and regulatory
agencies, coupled with several high profile cases concerning this subject,
the group concluded that "interdisciplinary practice and collaboration is a
critical strategy to reduce [such] errors. 242 Two of the most recently
implemented patient safety initiatives include Reconciling Medications
243
237. IRMI Supports Penn. Lawyers; Insurers to Blame for Malpractice Cost Rise, INS.
J., Jan. 3, 2002, available at http://www.insurancejoumal.com/news/ newswire/east/2002/
01/03/15685.htm (last visited June 20, 2004).
238. See infra text accompanying notes 237-244.
239. See MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 111, § 203(d) (2004).
Every licensed hospital, as a condition of licensure, and every public hospital
shall be required to participate in risk management programs established by the
board of registration in medicine . . .; provided, however, that licensed or public
hospitals which participate in pre-existing risk management programs may be
exempted by regulations of the board from the requirements of this paragraph.
Id.
240. See A History of The Massachusetts Coalition for the Prevention of Medical
Errors, CONFERENCE ON ENHANCING PATIENT SAFETY AND REDUCING ERRORS IN HEALTH
CARE, Nov. 9, 1998, at http://www.macoalition.org/documnets/MCPMEHistory.pdf
(last visited June 20, 2004).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. "Reconciling Medications" is a medication safety practice used to eliminate
errors of communication transfer at patient handoffs. Reconciling Medications: A
Medication Safety Collaborative, MASS. COALITION FOR THE PREVENTION OF MED.
ERRORS, at http://www.macoalition.org/Initiatives/RecMeds/ProjectBackground.pdf (last
visited June 20, 2004).
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and Communicating Critical Results.244 These safety initiatives, along
with others that the Coalition has developed since its inception, have
helped make Massachusetts less prone to medical errors.2 45 The fact that
Massachusetts is not listed as one of the eighteen states that is presently
experiencing a medical malpractice crisis is evidence of this
improvement.246
Accordingly, to achieve the positive results of Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania would fare well in ensuring that the Patient Safety
Authority is doing what it was formed to do and that all Pennsylvania
medical facilities are complying with the new reporting requirements set
out in the recent MCARE legislation. This approach is a fair solution to
risk reduction since the focus is on spotting errors in the current system
and implementing methods by which they can be reduced and eliminated
in the future. This is also a fair approach for both patients and health
care providers. By sing a "systems-based" approach, patients will be less
prone to becoming potential victims of malpractice errors in the future,
which will inevitably lead to a reduction in claims filed, thus resulting in
lower liability rates for doctors. In addition, the "systems-based"
approach will do all of this without threatening the economic security of
doctors or the patients' access to medical care.
Nonetheless, doctors and hospitals need immediate short-term relief
from high medical malpractice insurance rates and, although a systems-
based approach to error reduction is the best long-term solution to
Pennsylvania's crisis, it should be combined with providing subsidies to
health care providers in the interim period.
VI. Conclusion
The medical malpractice crisis in Pennsylvania requires immediate
action. The implementation of a more aggressive Patient Safety
Authority will aid in alleviating the state's current crisis. Although it is
impossible to create a perfect solution that totally eliminates all of the
problems that Pennsylvanians are currently faced with, the best approach
is to "design a system that makes the best trade-offs and maximizes
244. The goal of "Communicating Critical Results" is to develop strategies for timely
and reliable communication of critical test results to the clinician who can take action.
Communicating Critical Test Results, A Patient Safety Collaborative, MASS. COALITION
FOR THE PREVENTION OF MED. ERRORS, available at
http://www.macoalition.org/Initiatives/docs/CTRBackground.pdf (last visited June 20,
2004).
245. A History of The Massachusetts Coalition for the Prevention of Medical Errors,
supra note 240.
246. See 18 States Now In Full-Blown Medical Liability Crisis, MASSACHUSETTS
MEDICAL SOCIETY ONLINE, Sept. 18, 2003, available at http://www.massmed.org/pages/
profliabiltiyama.asp (last visited June 20, 2004).
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overall utility.
2 47
Implementing a more aggressive Patient Safety Authority and
developing innovative strategies to help prevent future harm to patients
would have positive outcomes. For example, it would help eliminate
future errors from taking place and help alleviate the problem of rising
insurance rates. 248  Although it may take a while for the proposed
solutions to work, there is no quick fix to the current crisis. Rather, the
only way to help alleviate the problem of rising medical malpractice
liability insurance premiums, in the short-term, is by providing subsidies
to doctors.249 This is why the state's new budget set an additional 35
percent tax on packs of cigarettes to help reduce the amount of money
Pennsylvania doctors will have to pay to the MCARE fund.250 However,
"[i]n the long term, this is about social choice, about how you're going to
deal with medical injuries-finding them, paying for them and trying to
prevent them., 251 Thus, while providing doctors with discounts to their
medical malpractice insurance premiums is helpful, it is "only a short-
term fix," and "in no way a solution., 252  Accordingly, Pennsylvania
would be wise to implement some of the measures that JCAHO has taken
to help reduce and eliminate medical errors. Because much value will be
gained by including JCAHO requirements, any burden on enforcement is
worth the advantage to be gained.
247. Paul C. Weiler, et al., Medical Malpractice: Facing Real Problems and Finding
Real Solutions: A Measure of Malpractice: Medical Injury, Malpractice Litigation, and
Patient Compensation, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 693, 725 (1994) (book review).
248. See Facts about medical errors, PA. CITIZENS FOR FAIRNESS, available at
http://www.pacitizensforfaimess.com/errors.html (last visited June 20, 2004).
249. Christopher Snowbeck, Big Payouts, Claims Blamed in Doctor Crisis, POST
GAZETTE, Jun. 6, 2003, available at http://www.postgazette.com/healthscience/
20030606malpracticehealth3p3.asp (last visited June 20, 2004) (quoting Randall R.
Bovbjerg) ("If you want to do something that will have an immediate impact, there's not
much you can do overnight except move the money around.").
250. Jennifer Nejman, Doctors Receive Abatements, YORK DAILY REC., Dec. 24,
2003, available at http://ydr.com/story/health/16953/ (last visited June 20, 2004).
Twenty-five cents of the tax will fund the discount to doctors, while the remaining ten
cents will go to the State's general fund. Id.
251. Snowbeck, supra note 249 (quoting Randall R. Bovbj erg).
252. See Nejman, supra note 250.
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